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 The business of mining for precious metals is nothing new to Mexico. Today it 
raises old troubling questions. In pre-Columbian times, the great empires of Mesoamerica 
chipped away at the region’s vast deposits of gold and silver, mainly for ornamental 
purposes. But the Spanish Conquest shifted small-scale mining to a much larger effort 
using forced indigenous labor. The gold and silver produced in Mexican mines exported 
to the Spanish monarch sustained its empire in the Americas. The colonial legacy of 
chattel slavery and debt peonage drove the mining industry after Mexico gained its 
independence in 1810, increasing widespread discontent among the marginalized masses. 
In 1906 this resentment erupted into a worker rebellion at the U.S.-owned and -operated 
Cananea copper mine in the northern state of Sonora—an event considered one of the 
precursors to the Mexican Revolution of 1910.  
 The triumph of the Revolution brought with it significant social improvements for 
the country’s native population. Under the new Constitution, indigenous Mexicans were 
granted the right to hold land communally, as they had before the Spanish Conquest. The 
reinstatement of the ejido system—a form of semi-autonomous communal land sharing—
recognized the incompatibility of Mexico’s indigenous population’s concept of land 
ownership with the European concept of private property and put self-determination of 
land use in the hands of indigenous communities.  
 Indigenous citizens were afforded the right to usos y costumbres, a traditional 
system of collective rule in which ejido members govern through popular assembly.  
 In 1991 President Carlos Salinas de Gotari eliminated the constitutional right to 
ejidos. Citing the “low productivity” of communally owned land, De Gotari amended 
Article 27 of the Constitutional to make it legal to sell ejido land and allow peasants to 
put up their land as collateral for a loan. This paved the way for the introduction of 
NAFTA in 1994, which, along with the agrarian reforms of 1991, effectively rolled back 
the agrarian gains made for peasants in the Revolution of 1910. However, in Oaxaca, the 
state with the highest number of ejidos, indigenous citizens can elect their municipal 
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political leaders through usos y costumbres. Oaxaca is the only Mexican state that 
formally recognizes this system of governance in indigenous communities, though even 
here it is only a partial recognition.  
 After NAFTA, Mexico’s relatively undeveloped mining industry had to compete 
directly with the U.S. and Canada. In much the same way that U.S. agri-business 
supplanted Mexican corn farmers, Canada’s mining industry—one of the strongest in the 
world—easily dominated the mining sector in Mexico. The 2005 figures by Canada’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, , illustrate its advantage: 60 
percent of the world’s mining and exploration companies are listed in Canada; 
Worldwide, 85 percent of the world’s mining deals are done in Canada; Canadian 
companies account for more than 40 percent of global exploration budgets; Canada has 
interests in more than 3,000 mineral properties in more than 100 countries. In Oaxaca, 
corporations based in Canada run all but three of the 20 current mining operations (two 
are Mexican and the other is run by a U.S. company). 
 In a 1993 Mining Magazine article, John Chadwick wrote that although in the 
U.S. and Canada,  
 weak markets, rising costs, increased environmental control and other 
 regulatory constraints have all taken their toll, mining, a great tradition in both 
 these countries, is far from dying. Mexican mining, by contrast, is not being 
 talked down, far from it. As a result of liberalisation and privatisation, 
 Mexico's mining industry is being seen to boom with rapidly rising 
 efficiencies, inflowing foreign investment and increasing exploration.  
 
 Chadwick wasn’t exaggerating. Without trade barriers in place, U.S. and 
Canadian companies could not only take advantage of Mexico’s weak labor and wage 
laws, but they could also breeze through the permit process with the help of local 
governments that most often accept these projects eagerly, with or without the consent of 
the population—a much harder sell at home. What’s more, these companies could 
accomplish this while sidestepping the headaches of the more scrutinizing environmental 
regulatory agencies in their countries. For example, if an exploration company wants to 
apply for a permit to mine in Quebec, that company must first submit a plan for the 
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mine’s closure in the future, along with a deposit equal to 70 percent of the estimated 
environmental clean-up costs, should an accident happen. When environmental 
destruction does occur, it brings a media firestorm with it.  
 But when Canadian firms operate in Mexico, bad publicity at home is not a 
particular concern. A LexisNexis search of Canadian press coverage of mining in Mexico 
turns up such laudatory headlines as “Foreign miners flocking to Mexico” and “Mexico 
lays out the mining welcome mat.” Coverage of the frequent devastation of communities 
and the environment wrought by foreign mining companies is scant, at best.  
 Engineers from Vancouver-based Fortuna Silver arrived at La Trinidad —a 
previously abandoned subterranean silver and gold mine—in 2006, while a massive 
revolt raged in Oaxaca de Juarez, the capitol city, just 30 miles away. The 2006 uprising, 
one of the most significant social movements of the last two decades, began when 
Governor Ulises Ruíz sent armed police to forcefully dislodge a peaceful protest by the 
Section XXII Teachers Union. Police fell on the teachers with tear gas and batons, 
driving them from the zócalo. Taking refuge in a radio studio at the Autonomous 
University of Benito Juárez, with the help of students, the teachers broadcast what had 
happened over the airwaves, prompting a surge of popular outrage from the city and 
surrounding municipalities. By the thousands , people poured in to confront the police. 
They pushed the police out of the city. The protesters set up barricades throughout the 
city, fighting back the police for six months. During this time protesters created the 
People’s Popular Assembly of Oaxaca (APPO in its Spanish acronym), which, along with 
the Section XXII, continued to fight against social injustices after an intervention from 
the army ended the uprising in 2007.  But stability was soon threatened by problems in 







Cracked Foundations and Dry Wells 
 
 “We felt a ‘boom!’ come from the ground, and then there was this crack in the 
wall,” said Bernardo Vásquez.  The cracks would appear sometimes suddenly, sometimes 
over time as the ground underneath the house shifted. 
 The Vásquez family (one of many here with this common last name, but 
unrelated) built their mud brick home two decades ago on the slope of the mountain 
above La Trinidad. It’s a modest one-room dwelling, with a dirt road in front and a milpa, 
or small cornfield, in back. On one end of the interior are an old T.V. and a few beds; on 
the other is a shrine to the Virgin of Guadalupe. A menacing, jagged crack splits the wall 
next to a makeshift clothes rack. Above, the trunk of a pine tree serving as a roof beam is 
buckling in the middle, splinters protruding.  
 Vásquez points to a discolored spot in the corner of the room, where water seeps 
from another crack when it rains. 
  “We built this house 25 years ago,” he said. “I hope my house doesn’t fall down, 
but the cracks keep getting bigger. If the walls give way, where will we go? We live in 
extreme poverty. There’s no future for us.” 
 The Vásquez house in one of more than 60 properties in the village of San José 
del Progreso, Oaxaca, that residents say have been damaged by the San José Project, the 
name given to the expansion and elaboration of La Trinidad.  Villagers say that Fortuna is 
using dynamite to clear tunnels underneath the town—often late at night, in violation of 
the law—and the tremors from the explosions cause structural damage to the buildings 
above. Fortuna denies that there are any tunnels running anywhere near San José, and the 
company maintains that no activity in La Trinidad can be responsible for whatever 
damage the villagers claim is taking place. 
 The entrance to La Trinidad lies less than 3/4 mile from town. Surrounded by 
barbed wire, earth-moving machinery, and stories-high piles of rubble, it is a stark 
interruption of the endless squares of cornfields, brushy trees and jutting cacti that stretch 
across the Ocotlán Valley.  
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Figure 1: Photo of the entrance to La Trinidad, taken in June 2010. As of December 
2010, a power plant lies to the entrance’s immediate left, a pipeline is being installed 
parallel to the road, and construction of a tailings dam, to the left of where the photo was 
taken, is near completion. An oversized Mexican flag flies behind the barbed wire fence. 
“We’re going to take down that flag and replace it with a Canadian one,” said one woman 
whose home has been damaged by the explosions. 
 
 When Fortuna began preparing La Trinidad for production in 2006, the people of 
San José had no idea that the municipal, state and federal governments had negotiated a 
50-year lease of more than 140,000 acres in and around San Jose del Progreso for the 
Canadian company to mine as it saw fit. Despite repeated demands from residents, the 
terms of these negotiations have never been released, and as a result, accusations of 
payoffs and shady deal-making have become part of the ongoing narrative for the mine’s 
opponents. Further, opponents vehemently point out that the concession is illegal 
because, located on an ejido, any land privatization would require either prior approval of 
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the ejidal assembly or a federal decree in the Agrarian Tribunal—neither of which took 
place, as reported by La Jornada and other media. 
 Once up and running in 2011, the San José Project will process up to 15,000 tons 
of raw material per day, according to company projections, which engineers will refine 
on-site through a process called froth flotation, in which air is passed through a mixture 
of water and finely ground silver-bearing rock material to separate the silver from the 
waste rock. The leftover slurry of water and waste material will be stored in a lined 
reservoir called a tailings dam some 500 yards from the San José Reservoir, which 
provides the village with water for irrigation. Fortuna estimates in company news 
releases that the San José project will yield 5 million silver equivalent ounces annually, at 
a cash cost of U.S.$ 6.20 per ounce.  
  Like other foreign mining companies working in Mexico, Fortuna runs all of its 
on-the-ground operations through its 100 percent-owned Mexican subsidiary, Minera 
Cuzcatlán.  
 “Cuzcatlán says we are making this up, but just look! This building is brand new,” 
said Chico Vásquez, pointing at two parallel cracks running across the wall of the Sunday 
School classroom. The interior smells like fresh concrete, and the wall sockets are still 
uncovered. Still, cracks run along the walls in each room, as if this were an old building 
giving way to the weather.  
 “Just last night there was an explosion,” he said. “You should have seen the dust 





Figure 2: Bernardo Vásquez points to water damage 
Figure 3: One of the cracks in the Vásquez house 
 
Figure 4: Chico Vásques points to cracks in the new Sunday school classroom, as 
community radio reporters take notes 
Figure 5: This small store suffered extensive structural damage 
 
Figures 6 and 7: In some cases, the very foundations of the homes are fractured 
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 All improvements in this community are hard come by. San José del Progreso 
remains the archetype of the poor Mexican Indian village. About an hour’s drive south of 
the pristine tourist hub of Oaxaca City in the state’s Zapotec region, it is one of Oaxaca’s 
hundreds of ejidos. 
 According to the federal government, fewer than 40 percent of homes in Oaxaca 
have running water, drainage and electricity. Forty percent of houses have dirt floors. 
Figures on social equality are no more enviable: one in five Oaxacans can’t read or write 
(illiteracy is even higher among women), and one in three children don’t attend school. 
One out of every four people in the state have no daily income whatsoever, and those 
who do have jobs make between three and seven U.S. dollars a day. 
 Malnutrition is rampant. Three hundred thirty-seven of Oaxaca’s 570 
municipalities are classified as severely malnourished; of the 100 Mexican municipalities 
with the highest levels of malnutrition, 45—most of which are indigenous communities—
are in Oaxaca. Statewide, only 10 percent of the population escapes some form of 
malnutrition. 
 But in villages like San José, even those figures seem generous.  
  Ironically, many of these impoverished communities sit atop large deposits of 
gold and silver. To date, the Mexican government has granted 30 exploration permits to 
mining companies. Taken together, those concessions cover nearly 2.5 million acres, or 
12.5 percent of the state’s territory—much of which lies on indigenous land, as is the 
case with San José del Progreso.  
 Like 90 percent of Oaxaca’s indigenous villages, San José depends on subsistence 
agriculture as its principal source of food. Water scarcity in the Oaxaca Valley puts the 
fields and animals in an already vulnerable position. Operating a mine requires an 
immense volume of water, and it’s not hard for a modern mine to use more water in one 





Figure 8: A family from Calpulalpan de Méndez begs for change. Poverty, malnutrition, 
and high infant mortality rates are rampant among indigenous citizens. Often families 
move from ejidos to urban slums, where they scrape by on handouts in Oaxaca’s colonial 
center. 
 
 Fears that the San José Project will impact natural water sources grow throughout 
nearby villages. Across the highway, in the village of Magdalena, residents say things 
have already taken a turn for the worse. 
 “Just look around. See how the homes and the roads have been damaged from the 
explosions. And even worse, the wells have lost water,” said Cándido Sánchez, the mayor 
of Magdalena. 
 “The people here are enraged. Ninety-five percent of the people here live in the 
campo, they depend on the water that falls from the sky and comes from the ground. 
That’s why people are angry about the mine,” he said. 
 There is no current documentation that water levels have decreased, or that the 
San José Project would cause such a drop in the well levels. A recent report from the 
National Water Commission, or CONAGUA, however, shows that such things have 
happened before in Oaxaca.  
 According to the report, gold and silver mining by another Canadian company, 
Continuum Resources (which was a co-owner of the San José Project before its takeover 
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by Fortuna Silver), dried up 13 of the 20 groundwater sources in the indigenous village of 
Calpulalpan de Méndez, some 60 miles south of San José. There, subterranean mining 
activities interfered with the natural circulation of groundwater, leaving residents with a 
devastating shortage of water for drinking and irrigation.  


























Testing the Sacred Cow  
 
 “How do we know if we’re contaminated? We could all be contaminated and we 
wouldn’t even know it!” bellowed José David Hernández, a veterinarian in the nearby 
urban center of Ocotlán del Valle. 
 In 2007, he received a surprise visit from a frantic subsistence farmer whose cow 
had fallen mysteriously ill. The farmer had walked 10 miles from his home in San 
Jerónimo Taviche to plead with Hernandez to come take a look. The municipality of 
Taviche is part of Fortuna’s concession, and the place where raw materials from La 
Trinidad were taken for grinding and processing in 2006. It’s also home to numerous 
abandoned mines, which have little to no monitoring by environmental agencies. 
 “When we arrived at his field, the cow was already dead,” said José David. “So I 
cut samples from the kidneys, lungs and liver, which I froze and sent to the toxicology 
center in Morelos. 
 “The results showed that the animal was full of arsenic, mercury, cadmium, the 
works,” he said, his eyebrows angling down and his voice rising. “It died from exposure 
to the toxic products the Canadian companies come to put in the Ocotlán Valley.” 
 José David’s toxicology results jolted the communities of the valley. Nervous and 
suspicious about the source of the contamination, they pressed Fortuna and the municipal 
government of San José del Progreso to release the environmental impact study, along 
with details on the negotiations for the mining permit, but got no response.  
 In 2009 José David and others living in the area took water samples from area 
wells and sent them to the University in Baja California for analysis. The results showed 




Figure 9: Toxicology results from cow in San Jerónimo Taviche. 
 13 
Figure 10: Email from the University of Baja California to José David Hernández, 
confirming excessive lead levels in water samples taken in the Ocotlán Valley. 
 
 Suspicions, fears, and uncertainty about the effects and impacts of mining are 
widespread in the Ocotlán Valley. Sometimes these fears are unsubstantiated—the belief 
that the San José Project is using cyanide to process the ores at La Trinidad is one 
example—but more often than not they come from the past experiences of other 
communities. The Ocotlán Valley is pockmarked with abandoned mines. The tendency is 
for mining companies to come promising the world; but they leave only an abandoned 
mine for the communities, still impoverished, to deal with. And abandoned mines are of 
much more concern than working ones. When the companies leave, the contaminants 
stay. Without oversight or maintenance, abandoned mines can be disasters waiting to 
happen. 
 Fortuna says the San José Project is different. “We engineered our operations 
using the worst case scenario of rainfall and groundwater, and we are taking every 
precaution to make sure contamination is not a possibility,” said Carlos Baca, Investor 
Relations Manager for Fortuna. “Everything is totally contained.” 
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 Baca says that the opposition’s arguments are based on misconceptions that come 
from horror stories from the north, where large-scale mining has a bigger presence.  
 “People accuse us of killing cows and putting lead in the water, and we haven’t 
even started operating,” Baca said. 
 But Hilario Vásquez Gómez, a resident of San José and a leader of the opposition 
to the mine, countered, “They explain very beautifully how this is going to be an 
ecological mine. When have we seen an ecological mine?  Never. There’s no such thing.”  
 Vásquez Gómez rejects the idea that opponents’ concerns are misinformed, and 
says that people in the Ocotlán Valley don’t need to look at what has happened in the 
north to understand the risks. “Look at Taviche! The people don’t have water, their corn 
is contaminated, their roads are in shambles, and they haven’t gotten any help from the 
mine or from the state. “And,” he added, “animals there were born with deformities.” 
 Mine opponents say that Fortuna will not respond to their demands to release the 
environmental impact study. However, Carlos Baca and Javier Castañeda, an engineer 
with Cuzcatlán, did offer to share the study for review for this report, though they warned 
it was a monstrous 800-page document of scientific jargon written in Spanish. 
 “That would worry me, especially if there are any bodies of water nearby,” said 
Daene McKinney, professor of environmental engineering at the University of Texas at 
Austin, referring to a photo of stories-high piles of waste rock near La Trinidad’s 
entrance shaft. McKinney said that the mine’s proximity to residential areas could also be 
of concern, though the real level of risk is impossible to deduce without detailed 
information on the project and surrounding ecology. 
 Similarly, any number of factors could cause fluctuations in the Ocotlán Valley’s 
water tables. Wells losing water because of exploration in La Trinidad is only one of 
many possible scenarios. But until an impartial environmental impact study is carried out 
and made public, the uncertainty of the communities on the ground will continue to be a 
source of tension. 
 Carlos Baca said that Fortuna is making efforts at addressing those uncertainties. 
“Our community relations department has a whole communication program to educate 
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people about our business. So we conduct project visits and invite people into our 
facilities so that they can see what we are doing.  
 “For example, there were arguments used that we were driving tunnels all the way 
down to San José, which is totally false. But as they started coming and looking at the 
work we were doing, they realized that those arguments are false. 
 Everything is a matter of communication. People always create interests around 
 politics, and they use whatever argument they can in order to obtain their 
 purpose. So the only thing left for the company to do is to keep working with t
 he community and to show them that we’re there to bring economic 
 wellbeing to everybody. 
 
 Residents who oppose the mine say they have never been invited into the mine. 
To the contrary, they say that their demands for information persistently meet silence or 
obfuscation.  
  Baca explains that Fortuna sees the San José Project as a win-win for investors 
and the community in San José del Progreso alike. For investors, it’s a high financial 
return; for the community, it’s a pathway to economic improvement.  
 “There’s a lot of marginalization in San José,” he said. “So everything we do is 
geared towards improving the quality of life and ameliorating the living conditions in the 
community,” he says. 
 Mining does have the potential to generate employment in an otherwise stagnant 
economy (though those employment opportunities end when the mine closes). Some in 
the Ocotlán Valley agree that the San José Project will bring economic benefits, and 
welcome the project as a way out of poverty. 
 “Our approach towards the community is to teach them to fish, not to give them 
the fish. By that I mean we create sustainable economic activity,” Baca said. “Remember 
that we employ 60 percent of our workforce locally, and we also create indirect 
employment by buying food and other products for our workers from the village.”   
 “What a joke!” countered Bernardo Vásquez. “There are maybe 50 people from 
San José who work for the mine, and this is a village of thousands. We are campesinos, 
we are not miners. Go ask Juana Vásquez how the mine has improved her life,” he said, 
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referring to a woman who worked as a cook for the miners before becoming an 
outspoken member of the opposition.  
 Adding to doubts over the mine’s potential benefits was the recent announcement 
by the Secretary of Work and Social Provision that seven mining companies working in 
Oaxaca—Fortuna’s Minera Cuzcatlán among them—were being sanctioned for violating 
federal labor and safety laws. Guadalupe González Ruiz, the functionary who made the 
announcement, cited hygiene, handling and transport of dangerous materials, mechanical 
equipment and fire safety as among the areas where the companies fell short of the law 
and violated the safety and health of their employees. González Ruiz did not give 
specifics on individual companies. 
 Fortuna points to local development projects it has undertaken in the community, 
such as building clean burning stoves, clean water storage tanks, and new bathrooms, as 
well as offering scholarships to the families who participate in the mine’s programs. 
Fortuna also plans to build a new hospital and a drinking water pipeline.  
 “It is a vile lie that they will improve our conditions,” Vásquez said.  
 This project was forced on us because it’s the government’s policy to impose 
 this business of free trade. Developed countries come here, take all we have, 
 and leave us with contaminated land. They come here and leave us poor and 
 sick, and then they go home to enjoy the wealth they took from us. And they 
 say it’s for our own good! 
 
 Vásquez Gómez insists, as do other members of the opposition, that those who 
support the mine are few. Asked if the freshwater pipeline and new hospital Fortuna 
proposed to build would help the community, Vásquez Gómez said,  
 What are these promises good for? God gives us fresh water from the ground. 
 Now we should be grateful that the state will control our water? And what  good 
 are ten new hospitals if we’re swimming in toxins? It’s a childish argument. We 
 won’t accept any such handouts. 
 
 But Fortuna maintains that these positions are marginal, and that the San José 
Project has been well received. 





 The Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI, has been in power in Oaxaca for 80 
years. In San José del Progeso, the PRI has maintained power in the municipal power for 
just as long. During that time abuse of public funds, political corruption, and intimidation 
of dissidents became staple features of the state government, and mistrust of the 
government grew steadily. Former governor Ulises Ruiz brought this to a high during the 
2010 election season, while things were heating up in San José del Progreso. As José Gil 
Olmos wrote in the national magazine Progreso, 
 The PRI applies all its tricks in Oaxaca: from the use of social programs for 
 electoral ends to plain and simple violence. What Governor Ulises Ruiz wants 
 is for his protégé, Eviel Pérez Magaña, to succeed him after the July 4 
 elections. To achieve that, its necessary to abuse the treasury, muddy the 
 campaigns, and resort to violence…and that is what he is doing. 
 
 Soon after residents of San José del Progreso learned of Fortuna’s operation, 
rumors and accusations of payoffs began circulating throughout the community. Principle 
among the rumors was that the PRI mayor, Venancio Oscar Martínez Rivera, received 
8,000 pesos—about U.S.$ 640,000—from Fortuna, and that Fortuna was giving handouts 
to the town in order to buy support. Residents also claim that Fortuna interfered with 
elections by financing the PRI and the opposition. 
 “The priístas stand outside the polls with ballots already made out for their 
candidate,” says Pedro Díaz, a community radio journalist and officer of the Section 
XXII who has been following the San José Project. “They say to the campesinos, ‘put 
this ballot in the box and bring me the blank one, and I’ll give you money.’ It’s one of the 
ways they maintain power, using dirty money to get elected and to create division in the 
community.” 
 Díaz shares the conviction that Fortuna, or its PRI supporters, is trying to buy 
support from the poor villagers either by direct handouts or by paying people top dollar to 
do bogus jobs, like organizing the rocks on the side of the road. Opponents cite poor pro-
mining members of the community suddenly driving flashy cars or building new modern 
houses as evidence of this.  
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 “We don’t have any documents to prove it,” says Hilario Gómez. “But this is a 
small town where there are no secrets. We’ve seen it happen, and even if we hadn’t, 
where else would the people here be getting money?” 
 “Mexican politicians are the biggest and baddest mafiosos around,” Díaz added.  
 “Absolutely not,” said Carlos Baca when asked about those accusations. “Our 
business is to mine. It is not our business to get involved with politics.” 
 Interestingly, the PRI was able to maintain power for so long in San José because 
of a low participation in usos y costumbres. But since Fortuna started its project without 
the approval of the ejidal assembly, participation and enthusiasm in usos y costumbres 
has surged to a level not seen before. For the first time, villagers there are using the 
popular assembly as a tool to challenge entrenched power and interests. In the upcoming 
December municipal elections, the Coordinadora is running against the PRI for the 
municipal seat, with Vásquez Sánchez the likely candidate for mayor. If elected, the 
Coordinadora will be able to pass a legally binding resolution to shut down the mine. 
















Consolidating the Resistance 
 
  In 2007, the Archbishop of Antequera-Oaxaca installed Father Martín Octavio 
García Ortiz as the parish priest for the diocese of San Pedro Apóstol. Father Octavio—
known locally as Padre Martín—was responsible for Catholic Church activities in the 
towns surrounding La Trinidad. 
 Padre Martín’s approach to his community was one of environmental education 
and activism. His religious teachings and activities were inflected with the doctrines of 
liberation theology and environmentalism—an approach tailor-made for the poor 
residents of his diocese who depend so crucially on nature for their subsistence. His 
outreach made Father Martín immensely popular with the population at the same time he 
became Enemy Number One for supporters of the mine. 
 Like so many others in the Ocotlán Valley, Padre Martín was alarmed by the 
results of José David’s toxicology report and the subsequent lead-water analysis. He 
made protecting the ecological and social integrity of the Ocotlán Valley a central subject 
of his sermons. Because he was the religious leader for numerous towns in the Valley, the 
priest became the connection among and between residents of the diocese, who had 
previously been unconnected.  
 As the opposition became more coordinated, they began planning a strategy for 
how to deal with the lack of information about the potential impact of the mine. With the 
help of Padre Martín, the opposition solicited the help of outside specialists to answer the 
questions to which they say Fortuna and the local government would not respond. In 
October 2007, those in opposition convened the first of several forums on mining, its 
impact, and how to deal with the problems mining caused. In the forums—held in Padre 
Martín’s town of San Pedro Apóstol, and attended by environmental and legal specialists 
from Mexico City’s Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and elsewhere, as well 
as by people from communities where large-scale mining had already taken place—
mining opponents shared experiences, expertise, and advice about mining’s effects on the 
environment and community.  
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 Following the forums, mining supporters denounced Padre Martín for instigating 
unrest around the San José Project. But Padre Martín maintained the support of his 
congregation and of the state’s religious community. In a published reply to 
denunciations of Padre Martín, the Diocese Commission for Justice and Peace said that 
the priest does not direct any group, organization or people. Rather, the reply said, his 
work is spiritual and religious, and his only involvement in social issues has been to offer 
education and information.  
 Several things emerged from these forums. First, legal experts confirmed the ejido 
residents accusation of the legal ambiguity of Fortuna’s concession because it was not 
approved by the ejidal assembly; further, they claimed, this violated Convention 169 of 
the International Labor Organization, a legally binding treaty to which Mexico is a 
signatory that mandates the consultation and approval of indigenous communities in 
decisions affecting the use of their land. 
 Fortuna says it has met all of Mexico’s legal requirements—a claim that may well 
be true, though the question falls in a legal grey area. Unlike the ILO Convention 169 and 
national indigenous land laws, Mexico’s Mineral Law does not mention the necessity of 
consulting of indigenous communities. Others argue that although in terms of legal code 
Mineral Law occupies a higher place than do the ejido laws relative to constitutional 
hierarchy but international treaties take priority over the Mineral Law. 
 Secondly, forum participants from mining conflicts outside Oaxaca advised the 
opposition to take direct action rather than wait for an unlikely intervention on their 
behalf by the Mexican legal system. Among these participants was Juan Carlos Ruiz, a 
representative of a San Luis Potosí anti-mining group called the Broad Opposition Front. 
Ruiz told the forum of his village’s struggle against another Canadian mine in Cerro San 
Pedro, in which residents voted 97-99 percent against the mining project in a statewide 
public referendum. Ruiz said the mining project moved ahead anyway, and by the time 
the village won an appeal in court, their land and water had been poisoned beyond 
remediation.  
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 Whether anything of this sort could happen in San José is a matter of speculation. 
But a population in which the failure of a harvest or the loss of groundwater is a matter of 
life and death is not likely to tolerate uncertainty when it comes to contamination. 
Whether fear of a repeat of Cerro San Pedro was realistic, neither the terms of negotiation 
over the concession nor the environmental impact report for the San José Project had 
been made public. This alone heightened anxiety. 
 The San José ejido’s next order of business was to close La Trinidad, which they 
did through popular assembly under usos y costumbres, making the action legally 
binding. The local authorities and Fortuna ignored the action and continued work as 
scheduled. 
 “These people have rebellion in their blood,” said Donaldo Esperanza, a former 
soldier in the Army’s Rural Guard who lives in San José del Progreso. “With everything 
they’ve seen…the government should be careful with these people.” 

















“La Tierra No Se Vende” 
 
  “We believe that native villages have the right to be consulted when it comes to 
this kind of project—they are projects that affect our social lives, the ecology of our land, 
and the relationship between the villages.” Bernardo Vásquez Sánchez Vázquez 
Sánchez said that when the people are not consulted and their ejidal customs not 
respected, they have no choice but to act by whatever means possible. On March 16, 
2009, hundreds of people from San José del Progreso, Magdalena, Ocotlán, and other 
municipalities did just that. Covering the roads leading to San José with stones to hold 
back police caravans, they marched to La Trinidad and told the workers there that the 
mine had been declared closed by usos y costumbres, and that they had come to enforce 
the closure. Protesters covered their faces with bandanas and wielded sticks and 
machetes, yet managed to take over the mine and the city hall peacefully. As they 
occupied the city for nearly two months, a yellow banner with the words “La Tierra NO 
se Vende,” or “The Land is NOT for Sale,” hung at the entrance of the city hall. Another 
banner at the mine’s entrance read “Cerrado”—closed.   
 A news release from Fortuna issued to investors on April 16, 2009, dramatically 
underreports the numbers of protesters—which range from 150-600, according to 
eyewitness, photographs and news reports—and mischaracterizes the nature of the 
protest. It reads as follows: 
 Fortuna Silver Mines Inc. (TSX.V: FVI / Lima Exchange: FVI) reports 
 that a group of demonstrators, ranging from 10 to 50 persons, have 
 illegally blocked the main access road to the San Jose del Progreso  town 
 and the Company's project. The majority of the people involved  are 
 from outside the immediate area of the project, and the demonstrators 
 include only a small fringe group from the San Jose del Progreso 
 community itself. 
 
Along with local authorities, the Company is engaged in discussions 
 with state and federal authorities to assist in bringing about a peaceful 
 and long term resolution to the road blockade. 
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 In the bowels of La Trinidad, protesters found 30 tons of explosives—five times 
the legal limit. The magazine Proceso reports the explosives were later confiscated by the 
federal government. Protesters descended into the depths of the mine, at 960 feet their 
passage was blocked by a rising floor of groundwater. Residents of San José del Progreso 
say they measured the tunnels running in the direction of the village, which they say 
continued under the areas where buildings were being damaged by explosions.  
 Reflecting Fortuna’s news release to investors, Carlos Baca maintains that those 
opposed to the mine are a small group of fringe radicals, who decided to takeover of the 
mine as part of a strategy to bring down the pro-mining PRI mayor of San José del 
Progreso. “Our operations were used as a political piñata,” Baca said. “The purpose of 
the protest had nothing to do with Fortuna; it was to use the mine and the mayor’s 
support of it to turn his people against him so that the PRI doesn’t win the election.” 
 “They always accuse us of seeking political interests from the beginning,” said 
Hilario Gómez Sánchez. “What interests are they talking about? We are peasants, not 
politicians. All we want is for the mine to go away. That, and nothing more.” 
 The opposition occupied the mine for over two months, during which time 
residents of San José and neighboring communities demanded that the state, municipal 
and federal governments open a dialogue. They received no response.  
 “On May 6, at seven in the morning, they surprised us with a police raid, with 
more than 1,800 police agents, helicopters, dogs, every police delegation—federals, 
judicials, state—every kind of police,” Vásquez Sánchez said. “They detained 23 of our 
compañeros and took them to jail.”  
 In a May 25 news release, Fortuna reported: 
The road blockade reported in a Company news release dated April 16th 
was brought to an end on May 6th by Federal and State police, as a result 
of a call to action by local Municipal and Ejido authorities. The Company 
and local authorities are engaged in dialogue with the fringe group of 
demonstrators in order to ensure an equitable long term solution to their 
concerns.  
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  A police detachment remains on-site to assure there are no further   
  disruptions on the access road to the town and Project. The Company  
  is in the process of gradually reinstating its ground activities. 
 
Fortuna has been carrying out exploration and engineering work at San 
Jose since 2006. This work has been fully permitted by the Mexican 
authorities, and the local communities have been kept fully informed 
about the Project through regular community meetings and briefings. 
There has been significant community support for the Project. 
 
 Among the jailed were Hilario Vásquez Gómez and Ignacio Vásquez Sánchez, 
brother of Bernardo Vásquez Sánchez. After the police raid, opponents of the mine in San 
José del Progreso, along with those in the neighboring communities of Magdalena, 
Maguey Largo, and El Cuajilote, among others, formed the Coordinadora en Defensa de 
los Recursos Naturales y Nuestra Madre Tierra del Valle de Ocotlán—Coordinadora for 
short—a coordinated front to facilitate the opposition’s ability to operate and strategize as 
a single unit. Vázquez Sánchez was chosen to lead the group. 
 The Coordinadora continued demanding, now as a coordinated unit, that the 
government open a dialogue with residents to discuss the terms of the mining company. 
With the help of the Section XXII, the Coordinadora was able to negotiate the release of 
its prisoners, and was able to make progress litigating their demands. 
 “It has been a strong and bitter political fight. Because of the priísmo in this state, 
the government does everything to avoid addressing the problems surrounding the mine. 
The situation keeps getting tenser,” Vásquez Sánchez said. 
 Anyone walking the streets could see evidence of this growing tension, amplified 
by the ratcheting-up of intimidation targeting political “enemies” that is part and parcel of 
election seasons in Oaxaca. The mine’s supporters, now organized in a group called San 
José Defendiendo Nuestros Derechos (composed, in large part, of people from other 
communities; mining opponents accuse Fortuna of creating and financing the group) 
carried weapons to intimidate opponents. Notably, so did members of the municipal 
government. 
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 “The priístas carried weapons and made sure everyone saw them. Even the mayor 
walked around with a sawed-off shotgun, as if it was a town without law,” said Donaldo 
Esperanza.  
 The unanimous decision through usos y costumbres to close the mine, the 
decision of opponents to take over the mine after the government to failed to respond to 
that decision, and the subsequent police raid on the opponents became a statewide 
political issue for leftist candidates in the lead-up to the July 4, 2010, state elections. 
Flavio Sosa, who was the leader of the APPO (where is this first mentioned and defined?  
during the 2006 uprising and a candidate for the Workers Party (PT) in the state 
congressional elections, was one of those who supported the opposition in the Ocotlán 
Valley. He said in an interview: 
 
 We are faced with a criminal regimen that uses state terrorism as a tool to 
 threaten and control the population, and that uses public resources to enrich 
 themselves personally and to entrench themselves in power. What’s 
 happening in San José is a clear example of this and of how business is done 
 in Oaxaca.   
  
 We have a corrupt government who is eager for money and who supports  these 
 investors without consulting with the population. The municipal authorities are 
 complicit with the state authorities in backing the investors, while the 
 majority of the population rejects this project because they weren’t  consulted, 
 because they feel it will affect their natural resources and bring contamination, 
 and because they feel it will bring even more poverty and suffering. 
 
 But power is a vertical structure here, where decisions that affect communities 
 come from above without consideration of the wellbeing of the citizens. 
 
 On June 19, 2010, tensions erupted in a village near San José del Progreso. 
Bernardo Vásquez Sánchez recounts what eyewitnesses told him: 
 As is the custom for the PRI in election season, the municipal authorities  arrived 
 at the village of El Cuajilote to intimidate the citizens there. The citizens, in a 
 subtle manner, asked the authorities to withdraw. The authorities then shot 
 at the people of the village, who ran in every direction to try to save 
 themselves. In the confusion, five of our compañeros were wounded and the 
 mayor and health minister of San José were killed by their own fire. 
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 Nine of the mine opponents were jailed following the clash, which according to 
the official story was an unprovoked attack on the municipal authorities by a belligerent 
group of anti-mining radicals. There is no video or audio recording of the incident to 
confirm either side of the story. However, the fact that the authorities and their supporters 
carried firearms and engaged in intimidation is well documented; no such documentation 
























Sins of the Father 
 
 A hand-written sign on the Church of San Pedro Apóstol reads “No Service.” 
Standing outside the empty rectory, Sergio Perez Lopez, the priest’s personal assistant 
and choir director, read slowly and deliberately from an official statement of the 
Archbishop of Antequera-Oaxaca:  
 
In San José del Progreso, where minerals are found, the problems of 
division in the community have been exacerbated now to the point of 
violence. Since this happened, some have pointed to Padre Martín as the 
cause of this confrontation because of his support of the mine’s opponents. 
  
We inform the public, and especially the priests, that we are working with 
every possible measure to clarify the legal situation of Padre Martín and to 
demonstrate his innocence to that which he is accused; we ask you all to 
join us in prayer to Christ the Good Shepherd that we stay united with the 
strength of the Spirit trying to uncover and defend, always, the truth. We 
urge you to encourage the faithful to join in this prayer to God the Father.  
 
To all Believers…we trust that in intense prayer before the Blessed 
Sacrament it may be possible to clarify this situation and to shine the truth 
and justice for the sake of all our people. 
 
We want and demand to know the truth.  
 
  “May the peace of Christ be with you,” Perez added.  
 Earlier that week, Perez drove Padre Martín and a group of choir members to 
evening mass in San José del Progreso. As they approached the chapel in San José, a 
pickup truck speeding toward them, came to a quick stop, its tires shrieking and filling 
the air with the smell of burning rubber.  A group of masked paramilitaries rushed 
forward and smashed the windshield of the church shuttle car.  
 “They told the Padre to get out, so he could pay for the problems he had caused, 
Perez recounted. 
 The Padre said, ‘ What are you talking about,’ but they wouldn’t let him talk, 
 they said it was because of him that the two people were killed. But the Padre 
 didn’t know what had happened yet. They forced him out of the car, they tore 
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 his shirt and threw rocks at his head. They were pointing a gun at him. So I 
 got out of the car to help, to tell them to be calm, but they just kept hitting the 
 padre and yelling at him. A crowd of people I didn’t recognize was gathered, 
 but nobody would help. It was if they knew ahead of time what was going to 
 happen. I went to the chapel, and there I found people who would defend the 
 priest, but (by then) they were driving away with the Padre. They took him to 
 a house two blocks away. I called the municipal authorities to ask for help, 
 but nobody would respond. The police came an hour later, and I told them  where 
 they took the Padre, but the police just left.” 
  
 Padre Martín later said the kidnappers tied him naked to a chair, beat him 
severely, and threatened to set him on fire, accusations that were repeated in the 
Archbishop’s statement. 
 
Figure 11: One of Padre Martín’s armed kidnappers walks calmly away from the scene. 
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Figure 12: Cell phone photo taken of the crowd of people Perez did not recognize—the 
mine’s supporters—gathered around Padre Martin’s car after his kidnapping. 
 





Figure 14: Mine supporters film the woman taking the pictures after she is spotted. 
Filming opponents is a regular form of intimidation in Oaxaca. 
 
 Pedro Díaz, a reporter from the community radio station Radio Calenda, 
broadcast the breaking news on-air. 
 “I made invited the kidnappers to call me at the station and say why they had 
taken the priest,” he said.  
 And when they did, “I told them to put Padre Martín on the phone, to show us he 
is alive,” Díaz recounts. “They refused. I asked what they wanted, who they wanted to 
negotiate with. They got nervous and hung up.”  
 But by then, the kidnapping was public. People throughout the valley heard what 
was happening and heard the kidnappers’ voices.  
 Following the radio broadcast, the kidnappers drove Padre Martín to the hospital 
in Oaxaca City, where they turned him over to police on the condition that he be charged 
with the murder of the San José municipal authorities. Police took the priest into custody, 
charging him not only with instigating the violence against the municipal authorities but 
also with being a member of the Popular Revolutionary Army, a guerrilla group that had 
bombed oil pipelines earlier that year. No charges were brought for the shooting of the 
mine’s supporters. The police made no effort to go after the kidnappers—two of whom 
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were later identified as Georgina González and Cristina Vásquez, the latter being the 
sister of a former San José PRI mayor. Both continue to live in San José unprosecuted. 
 Nancy Davies, who writes for the North American Congress on Latin America, 
wrote in her coverage of the incident:  
 "I'm a government hostage," Father Martín said from his hospital bed in Oaxaca 
City, as six state police officers guarded his room. "The state government has been in 
favor of this (mining) project. If I'm out of the way, they can work freely." 
 The Archbishop of Antequera-Oaxaca’s official condemnation ran in the daily 
Noticias on Sunday, May 10. Subsequently, more than a hundred priests from throughout 
Mexico joined in calls for Padre Martín’s release. The charges were eventually dropped, 
but the message to those who would engage in activism against the mine couldn’t have 
been clearer. As soon the priest was well enough, the archbishop moved him to an 
unknown parish for his protection. 
 Intimidation of political and human rights activists is business as usual in Oaxaca, 
especially during election seasons. But Padre Martín’s kidnapping, physical abuse and 
arrest were beyond the norm. 
 “It wasn’t just anything that happened. Doing something like that to a 
priest…there’s no reason for things to happen that way. Here in Magdalena maybe 90 
percent of the people are Catholic. This has never happened. The people are very sad,” 
said Magdalena Mayor Cándido Sánchez. Sánchez is a member of the Democratic 
Revolutionary Party (PRD), which enjoys support among many poor communities but 
has little representation at the state and national levels. 
 “It’s inhuman what they did to our padrecito!” sobbed a young Zapotec woman 
who would give her name only as ‘loyal Catholic.’ “Es inhumano y no tiene perdón!” 
 In the days following the deaths of the municipal officials and the kidnapping and 
arrest of the priest, San José del Progreso was a ghost town. Dogs barking and trucks 
humming past on the highway were the only sounds to be heard. The only human 
presence was a contingent of police guarding the abandoned town hall with assault rifles. 
Frightened residents in Magdalena would reluctantly crack open their doors and peer 
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outside, but would quickly shut and bolt the doors when asked for comment about the 
day’s events. Sergio Pérez was the only one to agree to talk, which he did despite his 
wife’s quiet protests. 
 
 
Figure 15: Armed police guard the empty city hall in San José del Progreso in June 2010. 
Among the slogans spray painted on its walls are “Cuzcatlán don’t exploit” 
and “6th of May will not be forgotten.” 
 
 Tensions remain high in the Ocotlán Valley in November. In recent months, mine 
opponents in Magdalena set ablaze a truckload of industrial hosing that was being used to 
build a pipeline through their town against the will of the residents and even the mayor. 
The pipeline, which runs from a treatment plant in Ocotlán de Morelos to La Trinidad, 
has been a contentious issue from the beginning because residents say the mayor of 
Ocotlán approved its construction without consulting the affected communities 
 “I can’t control the town anymore,” said Cándido Sánchez. “What can you 
expect? We’ve been petitioning the government for funds to improve our roads for a year 
with no response, and with the snap of a finger the Canadian company gets the permit for 
this pipeline.” 
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 Opponents in San José del Progreso recently took over the city hall again, this 
time because the new PRI mayor—installed by the governor after the death of the 
previous mayor—gave the go-ahead for a large garbage dump to be built on the outskirts 
of town without consulting residents. The December elections are drawing near, and with 
them both optimism that the Coordinadora will emerge victorious and uncertainty over 
what reaction that victory will provoke from the mine developers and the state. 
 Nevertheless, the San José Project is running on schedule, and slated to begin full 
operation in the third quarter of 2011. Fortuna’s President and CEO said in a news release 
that “Management is enthusiastic about the potential to increase silver and gold resources 
in this large and under explored [148,000 acre] land package.  Drilling recommendations 
for the San Ignacio and Taviche targets are currently under review and drilling is 




















 The story of the San José conflict is not one of a single struggle surrounding a 
mine. Rather it’s that of a broader struggle against systematic and predictable state 
repression and poverty, exacerbated by reckless foreign investment that puts stock value 
above community.  The conflict in San José del Progreso is but one symptom of this far 
deeper malady, and other such symptoms can be seen throughout Oaxaca.  
 The Secretary of Indigenous Affairs estimates that there are currently some 124 
agrarian conflicts in Oaxaca. On the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, a conflict rages over a 
wind-generating power project installed without the consultation or consent of the 
community. Opponents allege that the town authorities were paid off to allow the ejido to 
be used for the project.. After half a decade, violent conflict over indigenous rights to 
land and autonomy continues to broil between state-backed paramilitaries and the 
community of San Juan Copala. When residents in Zaachila learned in November that the 
municipal government had abused public funds it had promised to spend on much need 
infrastructure improvements, they held the mayor and other authorities hostage in the 
town hall, threatening to hang them if they tried to escape. And the list of grievances and 
reaction goes on.   
 On July 4, 2010, Oaxacans voted the PRI out of the governor’s office for the first 
time in 80 years. The governor elect, Gabino Cue, will head the coalition party “United 
for Peace and Progress,” made up of traditional parties ranging from the conservative 
National Action Party (PAN) to the leftist Workers Party (PT). Cue has not addressed the 
mining issue, even after his recent trip to San José del Progreso. Nevertheless, Cue was a 
supporter of Flavio Sosa, the APPO and the Section XXII during and after the 2006 
uprising. The Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD)—the only party to back the 
Coordinadora and demand clarifications on the legality of Fortuna’s concession—also 
have a seat in the new government, which took power December 1. What this will mean 
for the San José Project and the social ills resulting from Oaxaca’s entrenched political 
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